This March 24 mark the 39th anniversary of the Ross Store Explosion of 1985 in Los Angeles, California; a disaster that forced the evacuation of 4 square blocks, injured dozens of people, lit nearby concrete on fire for days and led to the City of Los Angeles abandoning its plans for a subway.
The Ross Dress for Less Store, located in 3rd Street in the heart of Wilshire-Fairfax District in Los Angeles had become an iconic staple of the rapidly growing surrounding community. Like much of the land underneath the Fairfax district, the neighborhoods and communities nearby shared a familiar dark secret; oil that is. The Salt Lake Oil Field – to be more precise.
Los Angeles had not always been an entertainment and tourism capital of the world. In the late 1800s it predominantly settled by fortune seekers looking for the black gold (like the Beverly hillbillies) that still saturates the area to this day. One must only look to the La Brea Tarpits (which sits on the Salt Lake Oil Field) to see it for your very own eyes.
In the late 1890s to early 1900s thousands of wells tapped into the Salt Lake Oil Field, but as the population centers started to expand outwards, most of the wells would become abandoned or get capped (Fox, 2007). Even today, some still persist in urban areas – but now have facades to cover up the machinery inside from public view. A few select examples can be found here:
Packard Well Site: 5733 W Pico Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90019
Beverly Center (directly across the street from Cedars Sinai Medical Center – one of Los Angeles’ premier hospitals): 8500 Beverly Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90048
Beverly Hills High School – Tower of Hope: 9876 Wilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills, CA 90210
Cardiff Tower: 9101 Pico Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90035
But just because thousands of previously active wells were capped did not mean that the danger they posed had disappeared as well. On March 24, 1985 this invisible hazard would show its face.
Disclaimer: While the official report on this incident concludes that the leak was due to natural decomposition of organic matter near the surface – and therefore not the result of the dozens of methane-leaking oil wells either directly underneath or nearby (Methan Gas Explosion Task Force, 1985), this conclusion has been highly criticized for being scientifically inaccurate, shifting blame away from the oil and gas industry giants, and misconstruing biased and questionable data in order to meet certain conclusions. Many in the scientific community have subsequently viewed this report as “a heavily edited script of happily blameless ending” through which the investigation started, ended, and the report written all in less than 3 months (Hamilton & Meehan, 1992; Khilyuk et al., 2000). By most modern accounts today, it was a hasty cover-up. Being as such, the conclusions discussed in article will rely primarily upon the findings of third-party scientists, researchers, and experts.
Additionally, a second incident in 1989 forced the reconvening of another task force investigating commission – which would find that abandoned oil wells leaking methane were the primary cause (Hamilton & Meehan, 1992;).
The morning of March 24 had started off like any other. It would soon all change. At around 5:00 pm (Bigelow, 1985) a large explosion enveloped the Ross Dress-For-Less Department Store located at 6298 West 3rd Street (Methane Gas Explosion Task Force, 1985), blew out the windows and partially collapsed the roof of the structure and reduced the store interior to a heap of twisted metal resulting in injuries requiring hospital treatment of twenty-three people.
The cause – methane.
Although methane is naturally occurring, the presence of old oil wells (both properly and unproperly capped) makes the issues and hazards substantially worse (Fox, 2007).
Unbeknownst to everyone, the abandoned oil wells below the store had been leaking methane for years. Being an invisible, odorless, and highly flammable gas, no one noticed when it started to leak from under the floorboards into an inner-room in the store that had no ventilation. On that particular day in March, it would meet an ignition source. The explosion rocked the area and sent flying debris hundreds of feet downrange. Pavement around the store burst into flames that could not be extinguished for days due to the pressurized escaping methane below. Cement was on fire and the street had started to melt.
It would take the efforts of hundreds of first responders (Bigelow, 1985) to conduct search and rescue operations, cordon off 4 square blocks around the site, evacuate hundreds of residents, customers from over 175 nearby buildings and the farmer’s market, 400 students from a nearby school (Ramos & Thackrey, 1985; United Press International, 1985), test air and vapor levels, and attempt to prevent additional exposures from catching fire.
Multiple mobile oil rigs were also brought into the area in subsequent days to begin venting the pressurized gas, which was also found to be at high levels of accumulation under many nearby properties including a K Mart (United Press International, 1985).
It looked like it was raining fire. It was like a cyclone. Gusting air, creams, ashes, black objects flying around. It was horrible. Everything was on fire (Ramos & Thackrey, 1985).
With at least 75 people in the store at the time of the explosion, it is a wonder how no one perished (Bigelow, 1985). The patients were transferred to nearby hospitals including – ironically, Cedars Sinai Medical Center – which is located directly across from an active oil well tapping into the very same oil field which caused the devastation. The operation and locations of this infrastructure remain active to this day.
With dangerous levels of methane being found underneath nearby middle school just a few blocks away (Fox, 2007) schools across the county were tested for methane gas in an early detection program effort (St. George, 1985).
At the time of the incident, the City of Los Angeles was making plans to build an underground Metro Rail that would connect various parts of the city.
“Wilshire Boulevard, one of the busiest thoroughfares in Los Angeles, was to be a central artery in this new subterranean network. However, the explosion at Ross Dress for Less exposed the heretofore underestimated risk of tunneling through methane-rich zones. Fears quickly escalated about the potential for similar explosions occurring elsewhere, particularly along the planned subway routes. The public, already wary of the high costs and disruptions associated with the Metro line, grew increasingly concerned about the dangers of tunneling through methane pockets.” (California Curated, 2023)
The issue would make it all the way to US Congress and eventually the project would be delayed and then eventually scrapped (109th Congress, 2006; Elkind, 2014). One positive safety outcome however, is that it led to the City of Los Angeles recognizing its need for better monitoring equipment, methane-zone specific building codes, and a public education campaign.
In 1990, a significant methane build up was detected at a nearby bank, forcing it to close for several months until the gasses could be diverted away from the structure. Even as far back as the 1970s, many capped and abandoned wells in the Fairfax area experienced gas and oil blowouts (Khilyuk et al., 2000).
More recently in 2015, a small methane explosion occurred near the corner of Wilshire and Curson, right across the street from the La Brea Tarpits, proving that this issue is far from resolved. Even to this day, the surrounding neighborhoods, and communities such as Park LA Brea – a French designed locally famous apartment subdivision in close proximity to the site of the explosion – regularly sees tar rising and methane buildups in the basements of its buildings (Fox, 2007). This is not that surprising however, especially when one looks at maps (such as this one from ZIMAS) showing the locations of oil wells directly in, under and around the complex.
Even the Ross Store which still stands in the same location as it did on 1985, now has large pipes that vent the methane from the subsurface to the atmosphere.
Lessons in Continued Threats of Abandoned and Capped Wells
It is the lesser of two evils. Long term versus short term. Allow wells to continue operating within our communities while recognizing that as long as they are operational, active safety protocols and accountability will remain, or shut them down and leave them to rot and leak into the environment and the water supply. There is no simple long-term solution – and that is a problem.
California, like many other oil-producing states, has a long history of failing to protect communities from the dangers of abandoned oil wells (Lewis, 2023). In all fairness, however, there is not much they can do once oil companies – many of them LLCs with just a few wells – close their doors. Not only does accountability subside, but the once active wells often become inaccessible; all whilst silently corroding away and leaking hazardous materials into our communities. The unfortunate reality is that once infrastructure is decommissioned, more often than not, previously-instrumented safety protocols fall to the wayside.
Over the last few years in Los Angeles, there has been a significant push by residents to shut down its last few remaining wells (Newburger, 2022; Witt, 2022). In late 2022, Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to do so (Costley, 2022). But is this the right decision?
Let’s analyze the facts so you can decide for yourself:
Consequences of Well Exploration and Production in Communities:
Active oil wells produce and can lead to a wide variety of health hazards including asthma, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, birth defects, cognitive and behavioral problems, and cancer (Gross, 2022). With an estimated 17.6 million people living within a mile of an active oil well in the United States, there is real threat to their health and safety (Czolowski et al., 2017).
Not only do oil wells negatively affect the environment through pollution and climate change, their exploration, drilling, and existence can disturb critical ecosystems both above and below the surface (EIA, 2022).
Water tables, upon which 25% of the population in the United States rely, can become contaminated through oil wells. Products of contamination include drilling fluids, hydraulic chemicals, methane, and the water used as part of the drilling process (Allison & Mandler, 2018).
Benefits of Continued Oil Well Operation in Communities:
Capping and plugging technologies can falter and degrade over time (Technology Subgroup of the Environment Task Group, 2011; Mainguy, et al., 2007), while hidden from access and view. These issues are shared by both old and new plugging attempts, especially when considering factors such as microbial corrosion.
With many wells being owned by small oil exploration firms – owning less than a dozen wells (California Department of Conservation, n.d.) – once they are shut down, so too does any sense of accountability for both the present and future issues they may pose. When active, facilities, workers, and the owners of the wells themselves must follow health and safety protocols (i.e. OSHA) which can mitigate hazards on nearby communities; but these too disappear as soon as they are shut down.
Additional Considerations:
California Geologic Emergency Management Division (CalGEM), the agency responsible for oil well oversight has only about 100 inspectors that handle over 37,000 idled wells (Associated Press, 2022) – not counting the 200,000 more that are abandoned, capped, plugged or active. This is made drastically worse by top officials within CalGEM prioritizing reporting numbers over the health and safety of Californians that live near oil wells.
“In the past, inspecting "critical" wells near "sensitive" locations was top priority. But since late 2021, following orders by a top supervisor, staff at CalGEM's inland office told The Desert Sun they felt forced to prioritize low-risk areas further from homes, where oil wells are thickly clustered and easier to inspect quickly… to meet the new steep and nearly impossible inspection quotas – instead of protecting public health.” (Wilson, 2022).
Lessons in Emergency Management Jurisdiction and Authority over Private Industry
It may come as a surprise to many when they learn that many Emergency Management Departments do not have authority over private industry within their territory, including oil wells (LA EMD Coordinator, 2023). This needs to change. Emergency management departments ought to be aware of the private industry hazards and internal plans so that in a time of crisis, coordination and communication can more easily occur with everyone on the same page. The very nature of the ICS’s development and implementation was to create a groundwork that eliminates the issues posed by each organization having unique command and control crisis management systems.
When looking back on the Porter Ranch (Aliso Canyon) methane blowout, for example, we can see this exact concern come to life. Private industry did not have a backup plan – as they should have – and it was only in the wake of a major crisis was this uncovered (Englander, 2016; ). The same goes for property development. It seems that neither the EMD or its emergency managers were consulted when the city decided to start building the neighborhoods around these hazards in Aliso Canyon (EMD Employee, 2024), a seemingly regular occurrence (Britton & Lindsay, 1995). Had they been “at the table” during the urban planning phase, many oil-related threats and hazards could have been identified, discussed, mitigated against, and prepared for via active dialogue between emergency managers and private industry in regards to maintaining community safety.
Unfortunately, this was not a seldom case. These oversights, whether intentional or not, are more common that many may think. Here are a select few out of the countless available examples:
Whittier, California faced a similar crisis in 2009 when a leaking underground crude oil pipeline contaminated dozens of nearby homes (Sprague, 2009).
San Bruno had an oil pipeline blast that killed 8 people, injured 58 and burned 35 houses (Homeland Security News Wire, 2013).
In each of these cases, emergency managers were seemingly absent from the consultation, planning, and communication process and cycle – until after the crisis unfolded.
Whether it be oil and gas, train tracks and hazard transportation, or chemical storage, emergency managers ought to be part of the conversation from the start; so that they can do their jobs by having the preestablished relationships and resources available to them that actively facilitate Prevention, Mitigation, Preparation, Response and Recovery in and for the communities they serve.
This is seemingly a systematic issue that urgently needs to be addressed.
Suggested Reading:
California Oil Inspectors Balk at Quotas, Say in-Person Reviews Neglected: https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2022/06/29/california-oil-staff-forced-to-do-5-000-inspections-a-month-with-no-time-for-in-depth-reviews/9908823002/
State finds 27 Oil Wells Leaking Methane in Arvin-Larchmont Area: https://www.bakersfield.com/news/state-finds-37-oil-wells-leaking-methane-in-arvin-lamont-area/article_52120332-00da-11ee-b466-83e7f8b280c5.html
Literally Millions of Failing, Abandoned Wells: https://www.fractracker.org/2019/03/failing-abandoned-wells/
Additional Resources:
Ross Store Explosion Aftermath footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97wKS-wIH2k&rco=1&ab_channel=CCSC
FLIR Footage of the La Brea 2014 Methane Seep as Pedestrians Walk on it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ctnjmrXP1kg&ab_channel=JeanetteVosburg
FLIR Footage of 2018 Miracle Mile Abandoned Well Leaking Methane as Pedestrians Walk Nearby: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KH0yYShCJY&ab_channel=Earthworks
Blog Documenting Salt Lake Oil Field Tar and Methane Leakage: https://bldgblog.com/2015/03/it-came-from-below/
Article Exploring Methane Leaking Oil Wells in Neighborhoods – Both Plugged and Unplugged https://www.fractracker.org/2019/03/failing-abandoned-wells/
California Hazardous Material Spill/Release Notification Guidance: https://fire.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/CalOES-Spill_Booklet_Feb2014_FINAL_BW_Acc.pdf
Los Angeles County Hazardous Release Reporting Matrix: https://fire.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Release-Reporting-Matrix.pdf
Incident Investigation Report (“addendum update”) regarding the gas leak at the Aliso Canyon Natural Gas Storage Facility: https://www.socalgas.com/sites/default/files/SoCalGas-175.pdf
Pictures:
Gas Explosion in Fairfax – Concrete on Fire https://calisphere.org/item/721103bd54f9baf481b9eaae0dac7ad6/
Los Angeles Public Library Collection: “Ross Store Explosion” https://tessa2.lapl.org/digital/collection/photos/search/searchterm/ross%20store%20explosion
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